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EMPLOYERS AS RISKS 
AMY B. MONAHAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, employees have historically been highly depend-
ent on employers for their retirement and health security. The reasons for 
this dependence are complicated, but it is driven in large measure by the 
tax code, which grants tax benefits to employer-provided health and retire-
ment plans that are unavailable to individual purchasers. A primary feature 
of this employer-centric system is that an employee’s ability to adequately 
control health and retirement risks, and therefore achieve health and retire-
ment security, depends in large part on the decisions made by his or her 
employer. Lucky individuals work for employers that sponsor well-
designed and well-managed health and retirement plans, while unlucky 
individuals have employers that decline to sponsor any benefit plans, or 
sponsor plans that continue to subject employees to significant risk. 
This article begins in Part I by briefly cataloging retirement risks, and 
then evaluates how effective employers are at controlling such risks. The 
article concludes that employers do not very effectively manage retirement 
risks. Retirement risks are well known, and an extensive behavioral eco-
nomics literature has established that certain plan designs can help control 
these risks. Nevertheless, many employers harm their employees’ retire-
ment security by failing to offer any plan at all. And among those employ-
ers that do offer plans, many ignore the significant amount of research on 
plan design and offer plans that either fail to minimize risk or in some cases 
exacerbate risk. 
Generalizations similar to those made about employer-provided re-
tirement plans are more difficult to make when it comes to employer health 
plans, but as Part II explains, after cataloging health-insurance related risks, 
there is reason to be concerned that employer plans do not adequately pro-
tect employees from such risks. Part III explores the reasons why employ-
ers often do not design plans that adequately protect their employees from 
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank Marty 
Malin and the entire Chica go-Kent Law School community for granting me the privilege of delivering 
the 35th Annual Kenneth M. Piper Lecture, and also Rob Meisburg and Stephen Sleigh for their insight-
ful comments on this lecture. 
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risk. The article concludes in Part IV by examining the role that law can 
play in reducing our system’s current reliance on employer decision-
making to control health and retirement risks, focusing on the recent exam-
ple of the Affordable Care Act in mitigating health risks. The Affordable 
Care Act does not eliminate the role of employers in achieving health secu-
rity, but what it should accomplish is to eliminate the significant element of 
luck that is present in our current system, by providing a federally regulated 
backstop for those individuals who are either not offered any health cover-
age by their employer, or offered coverage that fails to satisfy their prefer-
ences. 
I. RETIREMENT RISKS
Retirement security is often described as resting on a three-legged 
stool.1 In order for an individual to enjoy a secure retirement, she must 
depend on a combination of social security benefits, an employer-provided 
retirement plan, and personal savings.2 There are perhaps reasons to be 
concerned about each of these three legs, but this article focuses only on 
the second, employer-provided retirement benefits. 
Employers provide retirement benefits for a number of reasons. A 
basic reason that employers sponsor plans is to recruit and retain employees 
in industries where workers value such benefits.3 And retirement plans can 
also be used to create desired incentives for employee tenure and retire-
ment.4 In addition, because certain tax benefits are available only through 
employer-sponsored plans, and not to individuals saving on their own, tax 
motivations often come into play for both employers and employees.5
Before the 1980s, most employers who offered retirement plans of-
fered traditional defined benefit pension plans.6 These plans promised to 
pay workers a fixed benefit amount for as long as they lived following their 
retirement.7 Today, the majority of workers who are offered employer re-
tirement plans are offered a defined contribution plan, most commonly a 
 1.  See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, 401(K) PLANS IN 2010: AN UPDATE FROM THE SCF 2 
(CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES., July 2012).  
 2.  See id.
 3.  See Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Litera-
ture, 47 Indus. & Labor Rel. Rev. 417, 418-19 (Apr. 1994). 
 4.  See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE 
PENSIONS 2-3 (1992). 
 5.  See I.R.C. §§ 401, 408 (West. 2006). 
 6.  See James M. Poterba et al., The Transition to Personal Accounts and Increasing Retirement 
Wealth: Macro and Micro Evidence 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8610, 
2001). 
 7.  See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11). 
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401(k) plan,8 that does not guarantee a benefit amount and depends for its 
success on sound employee decision-making.9 The shift from defined bene-
fit plans to defined contribution plans is often described as one that has 
shifted risk away from the employer and onto the employee.10 The section 
below will take a closer look at retirement savings risks to understand bet-
ter how employer plans protect against or contribute to certain risks. 
A. A Brief Taxonomy of Retirement Savings Risks 
Perhaps the primary risk related to retirement is simply the risk of in-
adequate savings. Individuals who are left to make savings decision on 
their own may, for a variety of reasons, save at a level that is insufficient to 
support them in retirement.11 While classic economic theory holds that 
rational individuals would not, in fact, under-save,12 behavioral economists 
have provided ample evidence that many cognitive biases interfere with 
savings decisions.13 For example, individuals often use a hyperbolic dis-
counting rate in making long-term savings decisions: they give current 
 8.  Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010, 34 EMP. BENEFIT 
RES. INST. NOTES 9, 11 (Apr. 2013) (finding that among working heads of household who participated 
in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, 18.9% participated only in a defined benefit plan, 65% 
participated only in a defined contribution plan, and 16.1% participated in both). 
 9.  See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and Other Imperfect 
Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX REV. 471, 480-481 (2004). 
 10.  See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 
(2004); James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in Defined Contribution Plans, 13 
ELDER L.J. 285 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension 
System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 305 (2007). 
 11.  See, e .g ., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, Issue Brief, The EBRI Retirement Readiness 
Rating: Retirement Income Preparation and Future Prospects, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 
(July 2010) (estimating that 47.2% of early baby boomers are at risk of not having sufficient resources 
to pay for basic retirement expenditures and uninsured health costs). One large administrator of 401(k) 
plans recently reported that the average 401(k) plan balance for those ages 65-69 was $136, 800. Jill 
Schlesinger, The Latest on America’s 401(k)s, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2013, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-27/business/sns-201302271600—tms—retiresmctnrs-
a20130227-20130227_1_retirement-savings-fidelity-plans-fidelity-investments. 
 12.  See Monahan, supra note 9, at 473. 
 13.  See, e.g., Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information Overload: 
The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 
(2005); Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior,
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 81 (2007); James J. Choi et al., For Better or Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) 
Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING (David A. Wise ed., 2004); Brigitte 
C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings 
Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001); Olivia Mitchell & Stephen Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance for Retirement Plan Design (Pension Research Council Working Paper No. 2003-06, 2003). 
For a helpful overview of the literature on retirement savings decisions, see Melissa A.Z. Knoll, The 
Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision Making in American’s Retirement Savings 
Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1 (2010). 
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consumption greater weight than future consumption.14 They also often 
procrastinate in both making and implementing savings decisions,15 and are 
unduly influenced by defaults and framing effects.16 According to standard 
economic theory, a participant’s decisions within a 401(k) plan should not 
be affected by the plan’s defaults. For example, changing the plan’s default 
from non-participation, absent an affirmative election, to automatic partici-
pation, unless the participant opts-out, should not change participation rates 
because individuals will make rational decisions about participation regard-
less of defaults. Several studies have shown, however, that defaults do mat-
ter. Automatically enrolling participants in 401(k) plans increases rates of 
participation.17 Similarly, automatically increasing participants’ contribu-
tion rates raises contribution rates compared to plans where participants 
must take affirmative action to increase their contribution rate.18 Partici-
pants are also affected by how choices are framed, despite the fact that 
economic theory would predict no difference. For example, participants 
tend to elect the “middle” investment option rather than making an inde-
pendent evaluation of investment funds.19 There is also, of course, a more 
basic impediment, and that is that retirement savings decisions are very 
complex. They require an individual to determine when they are going to 
retire, the standard of living they would like to achieve in retirement, how 
long they are going to live after retirement, and how much money such a 
living standard of that length will require, among many other factors. To 
get these calculations correct, the individual must determine their anticipat-
ed rate of return on investments and adjust for rates of inflation. Such com-
plex decision-making often is difficult even for expert decision makers.20
Even if an individual chooses an optimal savings rate, incorporates 
reasonable assumptions about investment returns and inflation, and imple-
ments that decision in a timely manner, retirement savings are also subject 
to investment risk. That is, an individual may fail to achieve financial secu-
rity in retirement if her investment returns do not equal or exceed the return 
assumptions she made in calculating her retirement savings needs. 
 14.  See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 
(1997). 
 15.  See Knoll, supra note 13, at 1. 
 16.  See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 13; Madrian & Shea, supra note 13. 
 17.  See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004). 
 18.  See id.
 19.  See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 13. 
 20.  Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete 
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1999). 
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Because retirement savings are achieved over several decades, there is 
also the risk of financial shock. This risk actually has two, interrelated 
parts. The first is the risk that an individual will experience a financial 
shock pre-retirement and be unable to access a source of her wealth be-
cause it is in a retirement savings vehicle that is unavailable prior to retire-
ment. Nevertheless, if an individual can access such amounts pre-
retirement, there is an additional risk that the individual’s retirement sav-
ings will be depleted pre-retirement by using such savings to absorb a pre-
retirement financial shock. 
Finally, even if an individual has made sound retirement savings deci-
sions, met investment expectations, and not depleted her savings pre-
retirement, there is the risk that the individual will outlive her retirement 
savings. This risk is commonly referred to as longevity risk.21
B. How Effective Are Employers at Controlling Retirement Risks? 
Given the various risks inherent in saving for retirement through a 
401(k) plan,22 this part will analyze both how retirement risks can be con-
trolled through plan design, and whether employers utilize such risk mitiga-
tion techniques. The very first risk, inadequate savings, is perhaps most 
directly impacted by an employer’s decision to offer any type of retirement 
savings vehicle. If an employer fails to offer a plan, the employee’s only 
tax-favored savings option is to establish an individual retirement account 
(IRA).23 Forcing an individual to establish an IRA on their own increases 
the risk of inadequate savings for an employee because he or she will have 
to research a large number of providers, select from limitless investment 
options, and overcome inertia and procrastination to actually establish an 
account and begin contributing. On top of that, IRAs have much lower 
 21.  See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 462. 
 22.  This part will focus on defined contribution plan design for two reasons. First, defined benefit 
plans to a large degree protect against many of these risks. Such plans require no affirmative action on 
the part of participants to enroll or choose a savings level; they protect pension wealth prior to retire-
ment; and they provide a lifetime income stream as the normal form of benefit. While such plans do 
come with the risk of plan insolvency, federal insurance through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corpo-
ration fully protects against this risk for most plan participants. Indeed, the greatest risk for defined 
benefit plan participants appears to be that the plan will shift too much consumption into retirement for 
an individual that has alternative sources of retirement wealth. The second reason that defined contribu-
tion plans are the focus is a very practical one; the majority of working Americans are offered only a 
defined contribution plan. 
 23.  See I.R.C. §§ 408, 408(a) (West. 2006).  While an individual could save an unlimited amount 
on an after-tax basis, pre-tax savings of an equal amount will typically result in greater net savings. 
While pre-tax savings are eventually taxed at the time of distribution, the individual will generally 
enjoy greater net savings because she has been able to earn compounding investment returns on the full 
pre-tax investment, and tax rates are likely to be lower post-retirement, when the individual presumably 
has less income. 
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annual contribution limits than 401(k) plans. In 2013, an individual could 
contribute $17,500 of her salary tax-free to a 401(k) plan,24 but could only 
contribute $5,500 of tax-free dollars to an IRA.25
When we examine just this risk to an employee’s retirement security, 
we see that there is significant room for improvement in employer behav-
ior. Only 45% of firms in private industry offered employees any type of 
retirement plan in 2012, although the rate varies significantly by firm size 
and industry.26 While fewer than half of all firms in private industry offer 
plans, because plans are more likely to be offered by larger firms, 65% of 
all workers within private industry had access to a retirement plan through 
their employer.27 Nevertheless, the end result is that over one-third of all 
workers in private industry lack access to one of the three legs upon which 
retirement security rests.
Even when employers offer plans, not all workers elect to participate. 
Among those workers in private industry offered a defined contribution 
retirement plan, only 70% participate.28 Behavioral economists theorize 
that one reason that participation rates are relatively low is that 401(k) 
plans have traditionally require participants to take affirmative steps to 
enroll in the plan. Because inertia is powerful, and individuals tend to pro-
crastinate, setting the default as non-participation is thought to harm en-
rollment. When this theory was tested, the results were clear that an 
employer electing to change the 401(k) plan default to participation (unless 
the participant opts out) dramatically increases rates of participation.29 This 
process of defaulting eligible employees into the plan is referred to as “au-
tomatic enrollment.” Despite the clear evidence of increases in participa-
tion, and regulatory incentives offered to plans that offer certain automatic 
enrollment arrangements, fewer than half of all employers that sponsor 
401(k) plans automatically enroll participants.30
 24.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2012-50, 2013 LIMITATIONS 
ADJUSTED AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 415(D), ETC. (2012). 
 25.  Id.
 26.  DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SURVEY tbl.1 (2012), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/private/table01a.pdf. 
 27.  See id. at tbl.2, available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/private/
table02a.pdf. 
 28.  Id.
 29.  See, e.g., Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 17, at S173 (finding automatic enrollment increased 
participation rates by 17 percentage points at one company); John Beshears et al., The Importance of 
Default Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 4-6 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 12009, 2007) (finding automatic enrollment increased participa-
tion rates by 25 to 35 percentage points at one company). 
 30.  See MUNNELL, supra note 1, at 2. (finding that fewer than half of all 401(k) plans offered 
automatic enrollment in 2010). 
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As important as it is to get eligible employees to participate in their 
employer’s 401(k) plan, it is also critical that the employee participate at a 
level that will meet his or her retirement savings needs. A common rule of 
thumb is that an individual should, on average, save 15% of income over 
her working life in order to ensure adequate income in retirement.31 Among 
all participants in 401(k) plans, the average contribution rate is between 7.5 
and 8% of income.32
But here, too, there are well known plan design features that an em-
ployer can adopt in order to encourage employees to increase the rate at 
which they save. One method is for an employer to provide a matching 
contribution in order to encourage employees to save at a specific level. For 
example, if an employer wanted to encourage employees to save 15% of 
their income, it could offer a 50% matching contribution on the first 10% 
of compensation the employee contributed. The employee would be irra-
tional in most cases to contribute anything less than 10% to the plan, as he 
or she would make an instant 50% profit upon contribution.33 Most em-
ployers do offer matching contributions,34 but the most common formula is 
to match 50% of the first six percent of salary contributed.35 If a participant 
maximized her matching contribution under this formula, she would end up 
with total contributions to the plan of only 9% (the employee would con-
tribute six percent of salary in order to maximize the matching contribu-
tion; the matching contribution would be equal to fifty percent of the 
employees’ contribution, or three percent of salary, for a total of nine per-
cent). By tying the maximum matching contribution to an employee contri-
 31.  See e.g., AON HEWITT, THE REAL DEAL: 2012 RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY AT LARGE 
COMPANIES 3 (2012), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-
consulting/The_2012_Real_Deal_Highlights.pdf. 
 32.  See Craig Copeland, 401(k)-Type Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 28 EMP.
BENEFITS RES. INST. NOTES 2, 6 (Oct. 2007) (analyzing the average contributions by family income 
level); Fidelity Average 401(k) Balance Climbs to Record High at End of 2012, FIDELITY INVS. (Febru-
ary 14, 2013), http://www.fidelity.com/inside-fidelity/employer-services/fidelity-analysis-finds-record-
high-average-401k-balance (reporting 8% average deferral rate among Fidelity 401(k) plan partici-
pants).
 33.  Yet many participants do fail to take full advantage of matching contributions. See James J. 
Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. STAT.
748 1 (2011). 
 34.  See THE VANGUARD GRP., HOW AMERICA SAVES 2013: A REPORT ON VANGUARD 2012
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN DATA 13 (2013), available at
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/HAS13.pdf. (82% of plans offered a matching contribution); 




of plans sponsors offer matching and/or profit sharing contributions). 
 35.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 13; DELOITTE, supra note 34, at 13. 
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bution of six percent, the employer is likely sending a signal to employees 
that six percent is the ideal employee contribution rate, which may work 
against adequate savings. It is also important to keep in mind that, although 
matching contributions are powerful incentives to save a specific amount, 
in practice not all participants contribute enough to maximize the matching 
contribution.36
Another well-established method to increase savings rates is to im-
plement automatic contribution rate increases at specified intervals.37  Most 
commonly, these automatic increases are implemented along with automat-
ic enrollment, but the two do not need to be tied together. For example, a 
plan might provide that the initial default contribution rate is 3%, but that 
the rate will increase at 1% per year until the individual is saving 10% of 
her income. Because these are changes to defaults only, a participant is 
always free to lower his or her contribution rate, but needs to take affirma-
tive action to do so. Nevertheless, the change to the default is so powerful 
that the federal government has provided various incentives to encourage 
employers to choose to incorporate automatic enrollment with increasing 
contribution rates into their 401(k) plans.38 While many employers have 
adopted such plan designs, more have elected not to do so. Among those 
plans that automatically enroll participants, the average default contribution 
rate is 3% of salary, and only 34% of plans automatically increase that 
default rate over time.39
Another significant risk faced by 401(k) plan participants is invest-
ment risk. Individuals appear to make frequent mistakes when investing 
long-term savings,40 and many do not understand even basic principles of 
investing.41 These investors may subject themselves to unnecessary risk 
while failing to maximize return. 
A defined contribution plan can be designed to lessen the employee’s 
investment risk in various ways. Under the assumption that an employer 
may be a more sophisticated investor than its employees, an employer 
could invest plan assets on behalf of the participants in a defined contribu-
tion plan. Nothing prevents an employer from doing so. The likely reason 
 36.  See HEWITT ASSOCS. LLC, HOW WELL ARE EMPLOYEES SAVING AND INVESTING IN 401(K)
PLANS: 2010 HEWITT UNIVERSE BENCHMARKS (2010) (finding that 72% of plan participants contribut-
ed enough to maximize their matching contribution). 
 37.  See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 17, at S170. 
 38.  See I.R.C. § 401(m)(12) (West. 2006). 
 39.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 20; DELOITTE, supra note 34, at 10. 
 40.  See, e.g., Agnew & Szykman, supra note 13, at 57. 
 41.  It is important to note that sophisticated investors are, of course, much less susceptible to 
investment risk and can do very well at both controlling investment risk and maximizing return in their 
401(k) plans. 
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we do not see many employers offer this option is the potential legal liabil-
ity that would result from such a plan design.42 Employers would be sub-
ject to legal challenge if their investments appeared imprudent to 
participants. In addition, even unsophisticated employees may not feel 
comfortable allowing employers to make investment decisions when the 
employees bear any resulting losses.
Another method of dealing with investment risk in the defined contri-
bution context is for the employer to choose investment defaults in a man-
ner that takes into account the likely mistakes that individual investors may 
make. This would involve employers choosing an investment default that, 
according to accepted principles of investing, is appropriate for that em-
ployee’s time to retirement.43 Another option, currently being utilized by at 
least one large company, is to offer employees guaranteed returns using 
annuity contracts as investments.44 Under any of these investment risk 
mitigation techniques, an employer could at the same time offer unrestrict-
ed investment options through a brokerage window once a certain mini-
mum balance has been achieved, thereby accommodating even the most 
sophisticated investors. Again, only the defaults would change. 
The evidence regarding how well employers help employees to man-
age investment risk is mixed at best. Among employer plans that utilize 
automatic enrollment, ninety-one percent default participants into an age-
appropriate investment option.45 While the selection of an age-appropriate 
default investment option does not ensure protection against investment 
risk, it at the very least suggests that an employer is taking steps to help 
protect employees.   
However, most plans do not utilize automatic enrollment.  Participants 
in 401(k) plans generally must select their investments from a large menu 
of options. On average, 401(k) plans offer participants a choice of over 
 42.  Such an investment option is so uncommon that the large 401(k) surveys do not track such 
arrangements. See DELOITTE, supra note 34; VANGUARD, supra note 34. 
 43.  Target date funds would be one choice that would provide the desired personalization and 
one-stop shopping. See JULIE R. AGNEW ET AL., WHAT PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT TARGET-DATE FUNDS:
SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP EVIDENCE 4 (May 2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/FSP-WP-2011-2.pdf. But see Zvi Bodie et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The 
Designed-in Risks of Target-Date Glide Paths, 23 J. FIN. PLAN. 42 (March 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.fpanet.org/journal/CurrentIssue/TableofContents/UnsafeatAnySpeed/ (Analyzing the risks 
of target date funds). 
 44.  For an example of a plan that utilizes annuities in this manner, see Tara Seigel Bernard, A
401(k) The Promises Never to Run Dry, NY TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/your-money/a-401-k-that-promises-income-for-life.html?_r=0. 
 45.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 20. Note that the fact that a large percentage of plans utilizes an 
age-appropriate investment default does not necessarily indicate that the age-appropriate investment 
option is in fact a good investment option. It may be that the default fund, while age appropriate, has 
high fees. 
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eighteen investment funds.46 Yet research demonstrates that participants 
struggle to choose effectively among such a large number of options. When 
faced with a large investment menu, participants increasingly use decision-
making shortcuts, such as simply dividing their contributions equally 
among all available investment options,47 or by electing to invest in what is 
framed within the plan as the middle or moderate investment option.48
Yet another type of investment risk is present in many 401(k) plans, 
and that is investment options with high fees. High fees can easily diminish 
a fund’s investment returns over time. And yet there is significant evidence 
that many 401(k) plan participants end up in investment options with high 
retail-level fees, in many cases because those are the only funds the em-
ployer has chosen to offer within the plan.49 As a result, even where the 
employer might offer age-based portfolios as the default investment option 
in its 401(k) plan, and offer an additional broad menu of investment op-
tions, an employee may nevertheless be put at significant risk if nearly all 
of those investments have high fees.50 Overall, many employers appear to 
unnecessarily expose participants to investment risk through too much 
choice and high investment fees. 
Plans also appear to be poorly designed to protect against at least one 
of the financial shock risks. Recall that one financial shock risk is the risk 
of being unable to access retirement wealth prior to retirement and there-
fore being unable to respond to pre-retirement financial emergencies, while 
the interrelated risk is the risk of depleting retirement savings prior to re-
 46.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 46 (reporting that, on average, Vanguard administered plans 
offer 18 funds); See also 55th Annual Survey Highlights, PLAN SPONSOR COUNCIL OF AM. (2012), 
available at http://www.psca.org/55th-annual-survey-highlights. 
 47.  See Maureen Morrin et al., Investing for Retirement: The Moderating Effect of Fund Assort-
ment Size on the 1/N Heuristic, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 537, 537-550 (2012). 
48. See Mercer Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology and the Empirical 
Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense 26-36 (May 10, 2013)(unpublished manuscript) 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263353) (discussing the various ways 
in which large numbers of investment options within 401(k) plans harm participants).
 49.  Id. at 6; Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Exces-
sive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans 13-20 (Feb. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. 
 50.  For an overview of general fee levels within 401(k) plans, see DELOITTE, supra note 34, at 15 
(finding that 1% of 401(k) plans had an average weighted expense ratio of more than 1.25%, eleven 
percent of plans had an average weighted expense ratio of between .86% and 1.25%, thirty-six percent 
of plans were between .51 and .85%, thirty-one percent were at .5 or less, while a full 21% of survey 
respondents did not known their plan’s average weighted expense ratio). While it is difficult to compare 
401(k) plan fees to those incurred by investors outside of 401(k) plans, see DELOITTE, DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION/401(K) FEE STUDY (2009), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_09_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf; Emily Gallagher, Inv. Co. Inst., Trends in the 
Expenses and Fees of Mutual Funds, 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. 1 (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per19-03.pdf (providing information on mutual fund fees outside of the 401(k) 
plan context). 
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tirement. While categorizing the inability to access retirement wealth prior 
to retirement goes against financial planning orthodoxy, I see this risk as a 
real risk. For some individuals, it may be preferable to utilize retirement 
savings than to declare bankruptcy, lose a principal residence, or be unable 
to receive medical treatment. This is not to argue, however, that pre-
retirement access to savings should be easy. Rather, it is an argument that 
there are legitimate reasons to allow pre-retirement access to savings under 
the right circumstances. Existing law permits, but does not require, plans to 
allow both hardship distributions and loans prior to retirement.51
Plan loans are, in most circumstances, preferable to hardship with-
drawals because a plan loan requires an individual to repay the loan, with 
interest that accrues to the participant’s benefit. A hardship distribution, on 
the other hand, permanently removes savings from a participant’s account, 
results in taxation of the distribution and, in most circumstances, an addi-
tional 10% tax penalty for the early withdrawal.52 The result is a very sig-
nificant decrease in retirement wealth for individuals that receive hardship 
distributions. Loans are potentially problematic, too, if they can be used for 
any purpose as under current law. Where plans offer unrestricted loans, a 
participant can too easily view their plan account balance as an ordinary 
savings account, and use it to finance current consumption (such as a new 
car, or a desired vacation). An employer could try to mitigate the interrelat-
ed financial shock risks into account by allowing participants pre-
retirement access to savings through loans, but only for specified purpos-
es.53 The employer could then offer hardship withdrawals only where the 
participant has established that plan loan repayments would themselves be 
a financial hardship. 
There is little evidence that employers design their plans in such a 
manner. The vast majority of participants in 401(k) plans have access to 
plan loans,54 which some studies suggest have the additional benefit of 
51 I.R.C. § 72(p) (West 2012); Treas. Reg. §1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(i). 
 52.  See I.R.C. §§ 72(p)(1) & (t) (West. 2012).  
 53. One easy method of limiting loan availability would be to make loans available only for 
expenses that the IRS deems to constitute “immediate and heavy” financial need for purposes of hard-
ship withdrawals. Such expenses include: (1) certain medical expenses; (2) costs relating to the pur-
chase of a principal residence; (3) tuition and related educational fees and expenses; (4) payments 
necessary to prevent eviction from, or foreclosure on, a principal residence; (5) burial or funeral ex-
penses; and (6) certain expenses for the repair of damage to the employee's principal residence. Treas. 
Reg. §1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(i). 
 54.  John Beshears et al., The Availability and Utilization of 401(k) Loans 1 (HKS Faculty Re-
search Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-023, 2011), available at
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/5027953/RWP11-023_Madrian_alia.pdf (finding that 90% 
of participants in 401(k) plans had access to plan loans). See also VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 79 
(finding that 76% of all Vanguard-administered plans offered loans). 
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increasing plan participation and savings rates.55 There is no evidence that 
employers limit the purposes for which plan loans can be requested. While 
relatively few participants have outstanding loans at any given time, almost 
half of all participants who are able to receive a plan loan will take one 
within a seven-year period.56 In general, participants with lower income are 
more likely to take a plan loan than those with higher income.57 Up to a 
third of loans are reported to be used to purchase or improve a principal 
residence, while purchasing a vehicle or other durable good accounts for 10 
to 23% of loans, and educational and medical expenses combined account 
for another 5 to 16% of loans.58 Another survey, which asked more detailed 
questions about loan utilization, found that 39% used plan loans to pay off 
or consolidate bills, while very few loans were used for pure consump-
tion.59 Of those who terminate employment with a loan outstanding, 80% 
default on the loan.60 This default results in the taxation of the outstanding 
loan amount, along with an additional 10% tax penalty for most individu-
als.61 The good news is that while loans are widely available, and relatively 
heavily utilized, most are paid back. As a result, loans are likely the least-
troubling form of pre-retirement access in terms of their effect on retire-
ment security.62
Hardship distributions are also widely available, with 82% of employ-
ers allowing for plan distributions where financial hardship has been estab-
lished.63 Perhaps because of the negative tax and retirement savings 
consequences, or perhaps because of the restrictions on the purposes for 
which such withdrawals can be granted, hardship withdrawals are utilized 
at a lower rate than plan loans, with only 2% of all participants taking ad-
 55.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-5, 401(K) PENSION PLANS -
LOAN PROVISIONS 
ENHANCE PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME (1997); Olivia Mitchell et 
al., Turning Workers into Savers? Incentives, Liquidity, and Choice in 401(k) Plan Design, 60 NAT’L
TAX J. 469 (Sept. 2007); Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, Contribution Behavior of 401(k) Plan 
Participants, 7 ICI PERSP. 1 (Oct. 2001).  
 56.  Beshears et al., supra note 54, at 12. 
 57.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 81. 
 58.  Beshears et al., supra note 54, at 16. 
 59.  Id..
 60.  Timothy (Jun) Lu et al., An Empirical Analysis of 401(k) Loan Defaults 2 (2010) (Fin. Litera-
cy Ctr., Working Paper No. WR-799-SSA, Oct. 2010), available at http://www.prgs.edu/content/dam/
rand/pubs/working_papers/2010/RAND_WR799.pdf. 
 61.  I.R.C. §§ 72(p)(1) & (t) (West. 2012). 
 62.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-715, 401(K) PLANS: POLICY CHANGES 
COULD REDUCE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE ON WORKERS’ RETIREMENT SAVINGS 20
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294520.pdf. 
 63.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 84. 
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vantage of the distributions during the year.64 Nevertheless, because they 
represent a permanent reduction in retirement wealth, they can have a very 
significant impact on retirement income. The U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office reported that in 2006, $9 billion of 401(k) retirement wealth 
was lost through hardship withdrawals.65 They found that such withdrawals 
have the greatest impact on young and low-income workers.66 A low-
earning thirty-five year-old worker who took a $5,000 hardship withdrawal 
is estimated to lose 12% of her retirement income as a result of taking the 
hardship withdrawal, whereas a higher-earning participant of the same age 
would lose less than 5% of her retirement wealth because of her higher 
overall contributions to the plan.67 Despite the clear long-term risks associ-
ated with hardship withdrawals, few employers inform participants request-
ing such distributions of these risks.68
The final risk identified was longevity risk—the risk of outliving 
one’s retirement savings. Employers can easily address this risk by offering 
participants the option of receiving their account balance in the form of an 
annuity, if not making it the normal form of distribution. This is one area 
where employers clearly fail to minimize their employees’ risk. Defined 
contribution plans almost always offer a lump sum distribution as the nor-
mal form of benefit and the vast majority do not offer any type of annuiti-
zation through the plan.69 Instead, participants are left to either purchase an 
annuity themselves, or to self-annuitize.70
By examining retirement savings risks in more detail, it seems clear 
that many risks can be at least partly addressed through plan design and 
without interfering with employee choice. The evidence is also clear that 
most employers fail to do so, and rather than safeguarding their employees 
against retirement risks, the employers’ choices contribute to such risks. 
 64.  VANGUARD, supra note 34, at 84. 
 65.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 17. 
 66.  Id. at 19. 
 67.  Id. at 19-20. 
 68.  Id. at 26-27. 
 69.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K) COMPLIANCE CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 47 
(Feb. 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/401k_interim_report.pdf (finding that 99% of 
401(k) plans offer a lump sum distribution, while only 19% offer a qualified joint and survivor annuity). 
See also HEWITT ASSOCS., TRENDS AND EXPERIENCES IN 401(K) PLANS 7 (2009), available at
http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/Library/Hewitt_Research_Trends_in_401k_Highlights.pdf 
(finding that all 401(k) plans offered a lump sum option, while 14% offered annuities). 
 70.  See Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k) Accounts into 
Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 277, 285-86 (2010) (explaining the 
process of managing retirement wealth to produce an income stream in retirement). 
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II. HEALTH RISKS
Just as there are complex reasons why most working individuals save 
for retirement through an employer-sponsored arrangement, so too are 
there complex reasons why employers dominate health insurance coverage. 
First, the market for individually purchased health insurance has not func-
tioned well in most states due to various forms of market failure. In states 
that allow health insurers to medically underwrite policies, sick or risky 
individuals often face premiums that are unaffordable, or they are simply 
denied coverage.71 And in states that require health insurers to price cover-
age based on community-level risk, low-risk individuals are less likely to 
buy insurance, thereby raising the overall risk level for the insured popula-
tion, driving premiums to levels that fewer individuals can afford even at 
“average” prices.72 In contrast, employers have several significant ad-
vantages over the individual market. First, employees can pay for employ-
er-provided coverage with tax-free dollars, lowering the effective price of 
such coverage.73 By lowering the price of coverage, the tax benefit helps to 
get low-risk individuals into the group of insureds, thereby bringing the 
risk level of the group down and further lowering costs compared to the 
individual market.74 Second, employers, particularly large employers, en-
joy significant economies of scale and have much lower overhead costs 
than individual health insurance providers, again lowering the price of cov-
erage compared to the individual market. And finally, large employers 
benefit from the law of large numbers, which ensures that their group of 
insured individuals, which was formed for reasons unrelated to health in-
surance purchase, will have average risk levels—unlike individual insur-
ance markets which often have a riskier-than-average group of insureds. 
In addition to the better market conditions associated with group cov-
erage, there are also human resource motivations associated with offering 
health coverage. Employers who offer health insurance have the benefit of 
knowing that ill employees (and usually their family members) will be able 
to access needed medical care, thereby reducing absenteeism and other 
 71.  See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 73, 109-113 (2005). 
 72.  See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON.
629, 634-37 (1976). 
 73.  See I.R.C. §§ 106 & 125 (West. 2013). 
 74.  See Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes and Health Insurance, in
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 137, 146-47 (David A. Brennen et al., 
eds., 2013). 
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related issues that can affect an employer’s workforce.75 And like retire-
ment plans, health plans are a way for employers to compete for desired 
employees in a tight labor market,76 particularly given the fact that em-
ployer-provided coverage has advantages that are unavailable to individu-
als purchasing coverage on their own. 
While employer plans have been a significant source of health insur-
ance for working Americans for many decades, how employers choose to 
structure their plans has changed in ways that are significant from a risk 
perspective. Historically, health insurance in this country was based on fee-
for-service reimbursement.77 If a covered individual incurred a covered 
expense, the plan paid the provider for the service performed.78 The prob-
lem with this structure is that it potentially leads to the overutilization of 
medical services, driven by providers who stand to earn more money the 
more services they perform.79 As a result, a movement toward managed 
care plans began in the 1980s.80 Under managed care plans, financing and 
delivery are integrated and participating providers face various financial 
incentives to limit the amount of care provided.81 While managed care 
plans gained significant market share in the 1990s, a backlash against man-
aged care plans has since decreased their popularity.82 Managed care plans 
that gave doctors incentives to withhold care created a conflict between 
doctor and patient that was not popular.83 As a result, most employers that 
currently offer health plans offer hybrid plans (such as Preferred Provider 
Organizations or Point of Service plans) that share certain features of man-
aged care plans, but also give patients greater flexibility to receive care 
without a physician-gatekeeper controlling access.84 In recent years, in an 
effort to better address cost containment, so-called consumer-driven health 
 75.  See, e.g., Ellen O’Brien, Employers’ Benefits From Workers’ Health Insurance, 81 MILBANK 
Q. 5 (2003). 
 76.  See id.
 77.  William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 141 (2004). 
 78.  Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The Origins 
and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 287-88 (2004). 
 79.  Id at 288. 
 80.  Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 30-34 (2002). 
 81.  See McLean & Richards, supra note 78, at 297-98. 
 82.  See Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 777, 789 (2006). 
 83.  See id.
 84.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, 2013 EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 55 (2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word
press.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-20131.pdf (finding that 76% of all firms that offer 
health benefits offer a preferred provider organization (“PPO”) plan). 
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plans have gained popularity.85 Consumer-driven plans aim to give patients 
a financial incentive to make optimal medical consumption decisions and 
take better care of themselves by allowing them to share in the savings of 
declining unnecessary care or using lower-cost providers.86 Because partic-
ipants in consumer-driven health plans typically bear a larger percentage of 
their health care costs than do participants in traditional health plans, the 
shift from fee-for-service health plans to consumer-driven health plans has 
been analogized to the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans, as both can be characterized as shifting risk from employer to em-
ployee.87
A. A Brief Taxonomy of Health Insurance-Related Risks 
When people think about risk in the context of health insurance, they 
often think only of the risk of being uninsured. The risks involved are not 
so simple, however. To be sure, being uninsured against medical expenses 
is risky. Given the significant cost of medical care, and the difficulty of 
predicting when and to what extent an individual will need such care, being 
uninsured subjects an individual to dangerous levels of risk. If the individ-
ual is uninsured and needs medical care, the individual may face either a 
lack of care (because the provider will not provide the services without 
upfront payment) or financial devastation (being forced into bankruptcy 
when unable to pay for necessary medical services that have been provid-
ed). However, as we will see below, these risks can also affect those with 
health insurance. 
Health insurance does not guarantee that a covered individual is fully 
protected against risk.  Health insurance contracts do not cover every pos-
sible medical treatment nor every available medical provider.  In addition, 
most health insurance contracts impose some type of cost sharing, meaning 
that the covered individual must contribute toward the cost of care through 
deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance requirements.  As a result, even 
insured individuals face both access to care risk and financial risk.  If an 
individual’s health insurance contract does not cover desired medical care, 
and the individual does not have the means to pay for such care directly, 
she may not be able to access the care.88  In addition, even where the pro-
 85.  See id. at 145. 
 86.  See Monahan, supra note 82, at 792. 
 87.  See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 82, at 843-47; Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 508-09. 
 88.  One of the core purposes of health insurance is to give individuals access to care they could 
not otherwise afford, but this is no guarantee that all insurance contracts will provide such access.  See
Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1908 (2011). 
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vider does not demand upfront payment and the individual is therefore able 
to receive the desired care, the individual may still face financial devasta-
tion when the provider attempts to collect the bill.89 Similarly, even where 
an insured individual has health insurance that covers the medical care 
received by the individual, if the cost sharing requirements are unafforda-
ble, the individual may again face significant financial risk. In other words, 
even those with health insurance may have incomplete coverage and there-
fore be subject to the same types of risks as the uninsured. 
Finally, underlying all of these risks is what I will refer to as medical 
risk—the risk of an individual experiencing health problems. Ideally, health 
insurance would help lessen this risk, by encouraging health-improving 
behaviors, but of course, it does not always do so. In fact, the risk of poor 
health may (and I emphasize may) be exacerbated by health insurance cov-
erage that insulates individuals from the financial cost of poor health.90
That is, adequate health insurance may have the perverse effect of discour-
aging individuals from safeguarding their health.91
B. How Effective Are Employers at Controlling Health Risks? 
Health risks are even more complex than retirement risks. An individ-
ual saving for retirement has a relatively simple goal: to save sufficient 
capital to produce the income stream the individual has calculated is neces-
sary to support the desired retirement. The planning process is imperfect 
and uncertain, to be sure, but not nearly as difficult as controlling risk in 
the health context.  An individual who wants to protect against health risks 
is protecting against a very uncertain risk.  No individual knows exactly 
what health services he or she will require or desire in the future, or which 
provider will be ideal for those uncertain services.  While one might as-
sume that this uncertainty is easily dealt with by purchasing insurance that 
broadly protects against all health risks, such coverage is in practice not 
available.  Health insurance contracts do not (and arguably, cannot) spell 
 89.  See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COST AND ACCESS CHALLENGES: A COMPARISON OF 
EXPERIENCES BETWEEN UNINSURED AND PRIVATELY INSURED ADULTS AGED 55 TO 64 WITH SENIORS 
ON MEDICARE 3-4 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com
/2013/01/8320.pdf (finding that 17% of privately insured individuals aged 55 to 64 reported delaying 
health care or having unmet health needs; 71% of those attributed the delay or unmet need to concerns 
over cost). 
 90.  See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.
L. & ECON. 519, 524 (2007). 
 91.  See id.
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out precisely what will be covered and what will not be.92 As a result, indi-
viduals are attempting to protect against unknown risk through uncertain 
contracts.
In terms of controlling risk, perhaps the most significant difference be-
tween employer health plans and employer 401(k) plan is that retirement 
savings can be very effectively individualized. In a 401(k) plan, the em-
ployer can set defaults that are appropriate for most participants, while 
allowing any individual that desires a different savings strategy to make a 
different decision. That dynamic is absent in employer health plans, where, 
at best, an employee may have a choice from a small menu of plan options. 
While there may be some plan choice, generally there is no ability to cus-
tomize a plan. If an employer offers plans that all have a $1,000 deductible, 
and an employee cannot afford $1,000 in medical expenses, there is no way 
for the employee to elect a lower deductible within the employer plan, nor 
can she easily access alternative private coverage in most states. In other 
words, for health plans it is not defaults that matter. It is the plan design 
that matters. Employers must get this right or their employees could be 
subject to significant financial, access, and medical risks. 
The fact that health needs and preferences are so individualized makes 
it difficult to evaluate how well employers protect employees from health 
risks. It is therefore helpful to think through how employers make decisions 
in the health plan context. One health economist has offered the following 
simplified overview of the employer-employee dynamic when it comes to 
health plans, “each employer picks the policy the ‘decisive worker’ in their 
firm would want, given the full net (of tax-subsidy) cost of the benefit; 
workers then make choices across firms” in order to find an employer that 
provides the desired health plan and compensation package.93 Assuming 
this model is generally accurate, firms would design plans to appeal to that 
elusive “decisive worker,” and prospective employees who find the health 
plan, in combination with all other aspects of the job and compensation, 
unattractive will seek work elsewhere. The result, even if we assume full 
information regarding health plans, is that employer plans are unlikely to 
satisfy all employee preferences, and dissatisfied employees may not nec-
essarily switch employers to compensate, as they must take into account all 
other aspects of the job and compensation package. The theory therefore 
presents the possibility that labor market pressures will not automatically 
 92.  See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 14-15 (1995) (explaining that “under 
the health care contract we use today, the nature, quality, and precise content of services to be provided 
in the future are generally not defined to any appreciable degree in the contract itself”). 
 93.  Mark V. Pauly, Making Sense of a Complex System: Empirical Studies of Employment-Based 
Health Insurance, 1 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 333, 334 (2001). 
2014] EMPLOYERS AS RISKS 769 
result in employer health plans that adequately protect employees from the 
risks identified. 
Relatively few empirical studies examine how this economic model 
plays out in practice.94 Instead, we are left to infer how well employers do 
at protecting employees against risk by examining various second-best 
indictors. First, among all firms in private industry, just 60% offered health 
benefits to employees in 2012,95 leaving a large number of employees po-
tentially subject to each of the health insurance risks. Only 72% of those 
offered medical coverage accept it, resulting in 51% of private industry 
workers covered by their employer’s plan.96 This relatively low acceptance 
rate suggests that employer plans may not satisfy the preferences of em-
ployees, but that is a tentative conclusion at best, and tells us little about 
why individuals decline offered insurance. Surveys of employees who re-
main uninsured after declining employer-provided coverage cite cost as the 
primary reason for declining coverage.97 Very few respondents indicated 
that the reason they decline insurance was that they did not need it.98 These 
findings tentatively suggest that employer coverage does not satisfy all 
employees’ preferences – hardly a surprising finding – but also that those 
who remain uninsured may face significant financial and access risks as a 
result. After all, if subsidized premiums are unaffordable, it is highly likely 
that actual medical care would be unaffordable as well. 
Employee preferences are easier to satisfy where the employer offers 
employees a choice of plans. However, 82% of firms that offer health bene-
fits offer employees only a single plan, although over half of all workers 
have a choice of health plans.99 This results in a sizeable portion of the 
employee population having only a single “take it or leave it” health plan 
 94.  See, e.g., M. Kate Bundorf, Employee Demand for Health Insurance and Employer Health 
Plan Choices, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 65 (2002); Michael Chernew et al., Quality and Employers’ Choice 
of Health Plans, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 471 (2004) (presenting some evidence that employers are respon-
sive to employee health plan preferences). 
 95.  DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY tbl.1 (Mar. 2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/private/table01a.pdf.  
 96.  Id. at tbl.9. Note that some of the workers who decline coverage from their own employer 
may in fact be covered by a spouse’s employer plan. And because employer plans also offer coverage to 
workers’ families, the total number of non-elderly individuals covered by employer plans exceeds 55%. 
THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 1 (2013). 
 97.  See, e.g., David M. Cutler, Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage, 6 
FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POL’Y RES. 27, 35 (2003). But see Alan C. Monheit & Jessica Primoff Vistnes, 
Health Insurance Enrollment Decisions: Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance 
Take Up (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 12429, 2006) (suggesting that workers 
that decline coverage may have weak or uncertain demand for coverage). 
 98.  Cutler, supra note 97, at 35. 
 99.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, supra note 84, at 55. 
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option, and increases the likelihood that some employees will continue to 
face health-insurance related risks even if they have coverage. 
It is also important to note that employer plans often impose signifi-
cant financial burdens on participants. Although premiums tend to be heav-
ily subsidized by employers,100 out-of-pocket cost sharing—in the form of 
deductibles, co-payments and co-insurance—can be significant.101 For 
example, while some employer plans, particularly HMOs, do not impose an 
annual deductible,102 among those plans that do, the average deductible for 
single coverage ranges from $691 in HMO plans to $2,086 in high-
deductible health plans.103 These numbers are significantly higher for fami-
ly coverage.104 High out-of-pocket costs can and do cause financial distress 
and, in some cases, bankruptcy,105 particularly for those in low-income 
groups. In addition, the out-of-pocket cost of care, even for those with in-
surance, may be significant enough that insured individuals either delay or 
do not receive needed medical care.106 One survey found that 17% of indi-
viduals with private health insurance coverage either delayed health care or 
did not receive needed health care, with the majority of such individuals 
citing cost as the reason for the delayed or unmet care need.107 While not 
definitive, these findings suggest significant risk is present even where an 
employee receives coverage through an employer. 
One final indicator of how well employers do at designing health 
plans that protect employees is employee satisfaction surveys – again an 
imperfect barometer. One recent survey found that employee satisfaction is 
relatively low, but varies significantly by plan type. For example, 57% of 
participants in traditional employer health plans were extremely or very 
satisfied with their plan, while that number was 37% for participants in a 
 100.  Id. at 67 (finding that employees were, on average, required to pay only 18% of the premium 
cost for single coverage, with the employer paying the remaining 82%). 
 101.  See id., at 96-138. 
 102.  Id. at 96. 
 103.  Id. at 108. 
 104.  Id. at 116 (finding average family coverage deductibles of $1,743 for HMO plans and $4,079 
for high-deductible health plans). 
 105.  The extent to which medical expenses contribute to or causes bankruptcy is much debated. 
See generally David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a 
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741 (2009); David Dranove & Michael L. Millenson, Medical Bank-
ruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. W74 (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Manag-
ing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 239 (2010); 
Amy Y. Landry & Robert J. Landry, III, Medical Bankruptcy Reform: A Fallacy of Composition, 19 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151 (2011). 
 106.  See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COST AND ACCESS CHALLENGES, supra note 89, at 3-4 
(finding that 17% of privately insured individuals aged 55 to 64 reported delaying health care or having 
unmet health needs; 71% of those attributed the delay or unmet need to concerns over cost). 
 107.  Id.  at 3-4. 
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high-deductible plan without a health savings account.108 The percentage of 
individuals who report being extremely or very likely to stay with their 
current plan if they had the opportunity to change tracks very closely to the 
satisfaction numbers just given.109 While it is clear that a significant num-
ber of employees are not satisfied with the coverage they receive from their 
employer, it is difficult to conclude from these data whether employer 
plans adequately protect employees from the various health risks. Employ-
ees may be unsatisfied with their health plans because they leave them 
vulnerable, or they may be dissatisfied simply because health plans and 
health care is expensive. What is easier to conclude is that for most indi-
viduals, if their employer plan is inadequate, they are unlikely to find better 
coverage elsewhere. 
One area where employers appear to be doing fairly well is with re-
spect to helping employees control actual medical risks. Health insurance is 
often theorized to increase the likelihood of individuals developing medical 
problems, simply because the financial cost of the medical problem is 
borne by the insurer, not the individual.110 Employers, however, often have 
an interest in minimizing employee medical risks, not only to control costs, 
but also to reduce absenteeism. Large employers have been in the vanguard 
with respect to health plan designs aimed to encourage the use of highly-
effective care and to discourage the use of less-effective care, through what 
is known as value-based insurance design.111 While this innovation has not 
yet become commonly adopted, having employers engage in such experi-
mentation allows others to learn about optimal plan design. One innovation 
that has become widespread among employers is the use of wellness plans 
to promote employee health. Of those firms offering health insurance to 
employees, 63% offer some form of wellness plan, with large firms being 
much more likely to offer such plans than are small firms.112 While there is 
concern that wellness plans may end up discriminating against the sick and 
low-income, studies have found that employer wellness plans can reduce 
 108.  Paul Fronstin, Satisfaction with Health Coverage and Care: Findings from the 2011 
EBRI/MGA Consumer Engagement in Health Care Survey, 33 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2, 4 
(Aug. 2012), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/Notes.Aug12.Final-CEHCS.pdf (note that 
the survey includes privately-insured individuals, which includes both individuals who purchase cover-
age through an employer, and those that purchase on the individual market).  
 109.  Id. at 9 (58% in traditional plans, 34% in high-deductible plans without a health savings 
account, and 49% in high-deductible plans with a health savings account).
 110.  See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV.
531 (1968). 
 111.  See, e.g., Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195, 
w195-w196 (2007). 
 112.  KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, supra note 84, at 201. 
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both health care costs and absenteeism,113 providing at least superficial 
evidence that employers may, in this area, be meaningfully mitigating 
health risks. 
III. WHY DON’T EMPLOYERS DO A BETTER JOB PROTECTING EMPLOYEES’
HEALTH AND RETIREMENT SECURITY?
The reasons that employers fail to provide optimal defined contribu-
tion plans and health plans are likely numerous. First, many employers are 
simply ill-equipped for the complex task of designing and implementing 
health and retirement plans. While large corporations easily and often ex-
pertly handle these complex design decisions, smaller firms simply do not 
have the expertise or resources to adopt a plan, let alone an optimal plan. 
Even for those employers that make the decision and devote the resources 
necessary to sponsor a plan, the employers do not necessarily have the right 
incentives when it comes to structuring employee benefit plans. Given how 
often Americans change jobs,114 employers do not necessarily need to ap-
peal to the long-term interests of their employees in order to attract and 
retain desired workers. Moreover, most employees likely do not pay 
enough attention to the intricacies of employee benefit plan details to create 
any type of labor market pressure to change employer behavior. Employees 
are likely to focus on highly salient features, such as whether an employer 
offers a retirement or health plan at all, whether the retirement plan offers a 
matching contribution, and what premiums and out-of-pocket expenses are 
in the health plan. Employees are unlikely to scrutinize less noticeable plan 
features, like whether the retirement plan utilizes automatic enrollment or 
quality investments, and whether the health plan covers specific treatments 
or utilizes quality providers. 
In practice, employers likely differ significantly in their ability to pro-
vide risk-reducing employee benefit plans. The largest employers, with 
large and sophisticated human resources departments that work with expert 
consultants, are certainly more likely to offer benefit plans in the first 
place, but also to thoughtfully design their plans in ways that minimize 
risk. For example, these employers can pay attention to employee de-
 113.  Katherine Baicker et. al, Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 304, 307 (2010) (presenting the results of a meta-analysis finding that every $1 spent on wellness 
programs produces a reduction of $3.27 in health care costs and $2.73 in absenteeism costs).  
 114.  See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NUMBER OF JOBS HELD,
LABOR MARKET ACTIVITY, AND EARNINGS GROWTH AMONG THE YOUNGEST BABY BOOMERS:
RESULTS FROM A LONGITUDINAL SURVEY (July 25, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov
/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf (finding that young baby boomers held, on average, 11.3 jobs between the 
ages of 18 and 46). 
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mographics when deciding the level of cost sharing that is appropriate for 
their employee population, in order to ensure that health plan deductibles 
and co-insurance levels do not prevent employees from accessing needed 
care. They can also structure sophisticated wellness plans, often using their 
own health plan claims data, to meaningfully improve employee health. 
Smaller employers live in a much different world. These employers 
often have limited human resource departments that may not have a dedi-
cated benefits staff. When it comes to establishing a retirement plan, these 
employers typically adopt what is known as a “prototype” 401(k) plan – a 
standard plan offered by a plan administrator. To establish the plan, the 
employer simply signs an adoption agreement that requires the employer to 
check off plan design features on a checklist a few pages in length. These 
plans both constrain employer choices and do not typically involve detailed 
plan design study on the part of the employer. In addition, many of the plan 
design choices an employer makes end up being driven by cost. An em-
ployer may select a 401(k) plan administrator, and 401(k) plan investment 
options based on which company will provide them with the lowest out-of-
pocket costs, not which will deliver the most retirement security to partici-
pants.115 And because participants tend not to pay attention to these plan 
details, employers do not feel much pressure to make different choices. 
While regulators could lessen or eliminate these risks by directly regulating 
plan structure, they have not yet chosen to do so. 
When it comes to health plans, small employers often rely on an in-
surance broker to suggest plans for them.116 Because the product the em-
ployer is purchasing is an off-the-shelf product, limited design choices can 
be made, and again it is unlikely that the employer would undertake a de-
tailed plan design study to inform their available choices. Employers are 
unlikely to change this method of selecting health plans, given that em-
ployees are likely to focus primarily on premium level and cost-sharing 
requirements.117
 115.  For a discussion of these issues, see Bullard, supra note 48. 
 116.  See Leslie Jackson Conwell, The Role of Health Insurance Brokers: Providing Small Employ-
ers with a Helping Hand, 57 HEALTH SYS. CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF 1, 2 (2002), available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/480/480.pdf.  
 117.  This is not to suggest that small employers are unsophisticated or unresponsive to market 
pressures, but rather that in this case there is insufficient market pressure for these employers to change 
their behavior. For a discussion of strategic small employer decision-making in the health plan context, 
see generally Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1935 (2013).  
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IV. USING LAW TO MITIGATE EMPLOYERS AS RISKS
A. Retirement Risks 
Given the rather stark evidence that employers in many cases fail to 
offer their employees any retirement plan, or offer them a plan that is not 
designed to protect against retirement savings risks, there is a significant 
role for law to play in mitigating employers and their choices as sources of 
retirement savings risks to their employees. Command and control regula-
tion would offer the most straightforward method of addressing the risks 
resulting from poor employer decisions. Congress could simply require 
employers to offer a 401(k) plan, and require that plan to meet very specific 
parameters. Of course, it is highly unlikely that Congress would do so. 
There are real costs to businesses to establish and maintain a retirement 
plan, and there likely is not the political will to force employers to do so. 
Nevertheless, while we may be unwilling to require employers to provide 
retirement savings plan, we could change federal law to make tax-favored 
retirement savings vehicles universally available.118
There is also much room for improvement in how we regulate the 
401(k) plans that already exist. When it comes to participant-directed re-
tirement savings, we have strong evidence of suboptimal decision-making 
on the part of participants, as well as evidence that merely changing the 
defaults to favor plan participation at an adequate rate dramatically im-
proves savings. We also know that the investment menu and investment 
fees are critical to retirement savings success. Requiring employers to 
adopt plan designs that default participants into appropriate savings rates, 
appropriate investments, and appropriate distribution forms will likely go a 
long way toward improving retirement security for many Americans. And 
while the default choices might not be optimal for everyone, the fact that 
they are merely defaults should lessen their impact on those who make 
rational decisions that differ from the default. The retirement plan world 
has changed dramatically in the last several decades. It is time for the law 
to catch up. 
B. Health Risks 
Because health risks vary so significantly among individuals, it is 
harder to come up with a legal prescription for health risks. Law could 
require employers to provide health plans, could regulate the type of health 
 118.  For a discussion of this possibility, see Amy B. Monahan, An Affordable Care Act for Retire-
ment Plans?, 20 CONN. INS. L. J. (forthcoming 2014).  
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plan to be offered, and could require the use of incentives to promote 
healthy behavior. But unlike retirement savings, which has fairly universal 
rules-of-thumb, and an easy way to accommodate individual choice, it is 
hard to come up with blanket recommendations with respect to controlling 
health risks. The ACA, however, provides a unique example of using law 
to mitigate employer choices that may subject employees to significant 
health risks, in a manner that largely preserves individual choice. 
First, the ACA provides a financial incentive for most employers to 
offer health insurance to their employees. For various reasons, this so-
called employer mandate is unlikely to cause many employers that had not 
previously provided a health plan to begin doing so. However, the ACA 
does greatly impact the employer market by, for the first time, offering a 
viable alternative to such coverage. Beginning in 2014, if an individual’s 
employer either does not offer a plan, or offers a plan does not meet the 
employee’s preferences, she should be able to select from a wide range of 
coverage on the health insurance exchange in her state. A variety of premi-
ums, cost-sharing levels and networks should be available to allow an indi-
vidual to control adequately many of the risks described above. 
An open question is whether these newly created individual markets 
will in reality function to allow individuals to better control their health 
risks. While it is true that we would expect a wide variety of plans to be 
available, individuals may still struggle with the complex decision of 
choosing the appropriate plan.119 Not only does choosing a health plan 
involve a large number of variables, health risks themselves are unpredict-
able and many factors such as quality are difficult for consumers to ob-
serve.120 However, the ACA does contain some provisions that should 
improve consumer decision-making. The ACA requires all plans sold in the 
individual and small group markets to cover the same minimum package of 
benefits (referred to as “essential health benefits”),121 thus eliminating po-
tentially significant variation among plans with respect to what medical 
services they cover. The ACA also requires all plans sold on the individual 
market to provide a concise “summary of benefits and coverage” that con-
tains basic coverage terms as well as examples of how various common 
expenses would be covered by the plan. These uniform coverage provisions 
and consumer-friendly and concise disclosures should simplify a consum-
er’s plan decision-making. 
 119.  See Russell B. Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The 
Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 527 
(2013).
 120.  See id.
 121.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2010).  
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The ACA is not perfect, however. Plans offered in the individual mar-
ket are unlikely to offer a wide choice with respect to the medical services 
covered by the plans. While all plans will be required to offer “essential 
health benefits,” it is unlikely that any plans will voluntarily offer benefits 
in excess of those mandated essential benefits. As a result, if an individual 
requires medical treatment that is not considered an essential health benefit, 
she is likely to find that insurance coverage for that treatment is not availa-
ble, thereby continuing to subject her to significant risk. 
Financial shock risks should be able to be better controlled once the 
ACA’s reforms take effect in 2014, because individuals will have the abil-
ity to choose plans with varying levels of cost sharing. For example, if an 
employer offered an employee a single health plan option with a deductible 
of $2,000 that was unaffordable for that employee, he or she will be able to 
go to the exchange and find a plan with a significantly lower deductible. 
This assumes, of course, that the individual will be able to afford the pre-
mium associated with the lower-deductible plan. 
While the ACA contains subsidies for low- and moderate-income in-
dividuals to purchase health insurance,122 affordability will undoubtedly 
remain an issue for some individuals. As a result, even if a plan were avail-
able that would adequately protect an individual against various health 
risks, that individual may be unable to afford such coverage. Compounding 
this problem is the fact that an individual can only purchase health insur-
ance coverage on a tax-free basis through an employer.123 If an individual 
must rely on the exchange to receive adequate health insurance coverage, 
she would have to pay for that coverage with after-tax dollars in most cas-
es. 
One risk that the ACA arguably will not help mitigate is medical risk. 
This is one area where employers may have a distinct advantage over in-
surers. Given that an individual may easily change insurance carriers every 
year, insurers likely do not have a significant financial motivation to create 
rewards for policyholders who engage in health-promoting behavior that 
may not pay off until years in the future. Employers, on the other hand, are 
likely to have longer time horizons to work with, and may therefore have 
an incentive to create long-term wellness programs aimed at improving 
employee health. Employers are also likely to benefit from such health 
improvements in ways other than reducing direct health care costs, thus 
further encouraging the formation of wellness programs. These programs 
 122.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1401; I.R.C. § 36B 
(2010).  
 123.  See I.R.C. § 106 (West. 2012). 
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are not without their downsides – they can in the worst cases act as a form 
of discrimination against the sick or poor – but well-structured programs 
can provide a meaningful improvement in controlling medical risks.124
It may be tempting to conclude that many employers should simply 
get out of the employee health care business once the ACA’s major reforms 
take effect in 2014, but that is not necessarily the case. Employers still have 
an important role to play in helping employees control health risks. Em-
ployers, if they are thoughtful about health plan design, may be able to put 
together a plan that better meets the needs of its employees than do availa-
ble plans on the individual market. In addition, employers are able to facili-
tate pre-tax purchasing of insurance, which can help make health coverage 
more affordable for many individuals. And finally, an employer has a dif-
ferent relationship to covered employees than does an insurance company. 
Employers have longer-term interests and an interest in keeping employees 
healthy that extends beyond mere direct health expenditures. We would do 
well to encourage employers to capitalize on that interest to create health-
promoting incentives. But the good news is that, regardless of what em-
ployers do post-ACA, employees will no longer be put at significant risk if 
their employer fails to offer a plan, or offers a plan that fails to meet the 
employees’ needs. Indeed, individual plans in the state exchanges will ef-
fectively act as competition against employer plans. Well-designed em-
ployer plans should continue to enjoy success with employees, while 
poorly designed plans are likely to see their enrollment dwindle as employ-
ees move to more attractive options. There is tremendous potential for the 
ACA to make meaningful changes to how health insurance is provided in 
this country, but we must continue to monitor health risks and be willing to 
make changes to the law as circumstances require. 
CONCLUSION
The ACA will fundamentally change the role of employers in ensuring 
health security for most Americans. It will do so not by removing employ-
ers from their historic role, but rather by providing, for the first time, a real 
option for individuals whose employers do not offer attractive, affordable 
coverage. No longer will employees be solely dependent on the luck of 
 124.  See, e.g., Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through 
Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 469 (2013) (finding “little evidence that 
such programs can easily save costs through health improvement without being discriminatory”); 
Baicker et al., supra note 113, at 304(finding that “that medical costs fall by about $3.27 for every 
dollar spent on wellness programs and that absenteeism costs fall by about $2.73 for every dollar 
spent”).
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having a sophisticated employer that thoughtfully designs health plan cov-
erage options. 
We still have work to do in this regard when it comes to retirement 
plans. If an employer fails to offer a retirement plan, or offers a retirement 
plan that has poor investment choices, high fees, or inadequate defaults, an 
employee typically lacks non-employer alternatives. The law can and 
should do a much better job of controlling employers as risks in the retire-
ment plan context. 
